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I.  INTRODUCTION 
This Symposium contributes to a wealth of scholarship in the area of 
Critical Race Theory (CRT).  The Symposium arises out of a CRT 
Workshop held in April 2003 at the American University Washington 
College of Law.  The organizers of the workshop1 hoped to spark new 
directions in the scholarly analysis of racial injustice and to reflect upon 
critiques of CRT from both “insiders” (internal critics) and “outsiders” 
(external critics).  While earlier workshops provided the necessary 
intellectual space for “founding” scholars in the field,2 the last formal CRT 
Workshop (prior to 2003) was held in June 1997 at Tulane Law School.3  
While these workshops do not represent the exclusive venue for thinking 
and writing about progressive racial theory, the organizers of the 
Washington College of Law CRT Workshop believed that reviving of the 
annual CRT Workshop would engender renewed interest in critical race 
analysis, initiate new theoretical directions for CRT research, and provide a 
forum for reflecting upon and responding to internal and external critiques 
of progressive race scholarship.  The works published in this Symposium 
effectuate this purpose. 
Any body of legal research endures—as it should—intellectual critique 
and engagement.4  As such, a wide body of literature, both progressive and 
conservative, has emerged in recent years that disputes Critical Race 
Theorists on many issues.5  The earliest external critiques of CRT 
challenged the embrace of race consciousness among Critical Race 
Theorists and critiqued the usage of storytelling in their writings.6  Later, 
external critics dusted off the attacks on storytelling but added a new 
dimension:  the second-stage conservative critics assailed CRT for being 
nihilistic and unduly cynical.7  While many able scholars have rebutted the 
central claims of this literature, the argument concerning CRT’s supposed 
nihilism should receive more scholarly attention, particularly in light of 
                                                          
 1. Pamela Bridgewater, Devon Carbado, Darren Hutchinson, and Leti Volpp 
organized the CRT Workshop. 
 2. See Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, The First Decade:  Critical Reflections, or “A 
Foot in the Closing Door,” in CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE 
THEORY 9, 18-22 (Francisco Valdes et al. eds., 2002) (discussing the importance of CRT 
Workshops). 
 3. See Stephanie L. Phillips, The Convergence of the Critical Race Theory Workshop 
with LatCrit Theory:  A History, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1247, 1248 (1999) (offering a 
chronology of CRT Workshops). 
 4. See bell hooks, Censorship from Left to Right, in OUTLAW CULTURE:  RESISTING 
REPRESENTATIONS 63-72 (1994) (discussing the importance of dissent and critique within 
progressive social movements). 
 5. See generally infra Part III (discussing internal and external critiques of critical race 
analysis). 
 6. See discussion infra Part III.B.1. 
 7. See discussion infra Part III.B.2. 
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efforts by many Critical Race Theorists to develop programmatic or policy 
agendas for a contemporary racial justice movement.8 
During the “formative” years of CRT, most of the internal critics focused 
attention on questions concerning the complexity and multiplicity of 
identity and subordination.9  Many scholars urged Critical Race Theorists 
to move beyond a “single-axis” analysis of racial subordination and 
identity and to develop intersectional or multidimensional frameworks of 
analysis.10  Other internal scholars challenged the “black/white paradigm” 
of CRT and urged theorists to conduct multiracial analyses of racial 
inequality.11  Today, multiracial and multidimensional analyses have 
become leading methodologies within CRT and have even influenced 
judicial decision-making.12 
Recent internal critiques push Critical Race Theorists into different 
directions.  Several internal critics, for example, have argued that CRT 
should abandon its embrace of race consciousness, which occupies a 
central space within CRT and other progressive racial discourses, because 
race is “socially constructed,” rather than “real,” and because race has been 
the source of brutality, repression, and inequality.13  Other internal critics 
contend that multiplicity theories and other identity discourses detract from 
what should be the broader goal of critical race analysis:  a critique of the 
material or economic harms caused by racial injustice.14  While several 
scholars have offered constructive critiques of the internal critics’ 
“progressive race blindness” thesis,15 the claim that identity theories divert 
needed energies away from a discussion of economic deprivation lacks 
significant critical engagement.16 
This Article contributes to the completion of some “unfinished business” 
within CRT by engaging insufficiently examined external and internal 
critiques of critical race scholarship.  The external critique of critical race 
nihilism and the new insider critique that dichotomizes identity theories 
and material harm warrant extended reflection because there are critical 
deficiencies that problematize these arguments.17  The nihilism critique, for 
example, falsely associates CRT with more radical forms of 
postmodernism and overlooks leading works in CRT which demonstrate 
that Critical Race Theorists inhabit an admittedly contradictory space.  
                                                          
 8. See discussion infra Part III.C.2. 
 9. See discussion infra Part III.A. 
 10. See discussion infra Parts III.A.1-2. 
 11. See discussion infra Part III.A.3. 
 12. See infra note 87 and accompanying text. 
 13. See infra notes 113-18 and accompanying text. 
 14. See infra notes 116-17 and accompanying text. 
 15. See infra notes 119-20 and accompanying text. 
 16. But see infra notes 116-17 and accompanying text. 
 17. See discussion infra Part III.C. 
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Critical Race Theorists radically deconstruct the racial hierarchies that law 
constitutes and reinforces, and simultaneously, they utilize both law and 
reason to advocate for racial justice.18  Whether or not Critical Race 
Theorists can sufficiently balance these conflicting positions exists apart 
from the false charge that CRT is ultimately fatalistic.19  Furthermore, 
CRT’s cynicism exists, in part, because the problem of racial injustice 
seems intractable; yet, the law, rather than offering solicitude to 
disadvantaged groups, largely reflects majoritarian interests.20  While 
Critical Race Theorists have persuasively unveiled the “whiteness” of 
United States legal institutions, they could fortify their claims by using 
empirical research in political science scholarship which demonstrates how 
legal institutions—particularly the Supreme Court—cater to majoritarian, 
rather than minority, interests.21  If this research is accurate, then the 
conservative critics’ animosity toward CRT’s cynicism is misplaced; the 
Critical Race Theorists have reason to express alarm. 
Insider critiques of CRT also require critical assessment.  Recent internal 
critics complain that racial identity discourse, including 
multidimensionality theory, marginalizes more important attention to 
material, class, or economic issues.22  If their claim holds true, the material 
harm critics serve a vital purpose:  because racial injustice causes and 
interacts with economic deprivation, any progressive racial justice 
movement should interrogate class and economic inequality concerns.23  
Nevertheless, the analysis of the material harm critics suffers because it 
dichotomizes class and multidimensionality.24  Although these critics 
bifurcate multiplicity and class analysis, multiplicity theories relate to class 
analysis in two important respects.25  First, poverty has multidimensional 
sources.  Gender, sexuality, race, and other factors contribute to economic 
disadvantage.26  Accordingly, an accurate account of economic inequality 
must consider the multidimensionality of structures of subordination.  
Second, poverty (alongside race, gender, class, and sexuality) is a source of 
identity construction and social group experiences; as such, any 
comprehensive analysis of identity should take class into account.27 
                                                          
 18. See infra Part III.C.2. 
 19. See Jeffrey Rosen, The Bloods and the Crits, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 9, 1996, at 
27 (criticizing as fatalistic CRT’s rejection of law to achieve social change, along with its 
contention that facially neutral laws “fuel white domination”). 
 20. See infra notes 177-82 and accompanying text. 
 21. Id. 
 22. See discussion infra Part III.C.1. 
 23. See infra notes 162-68 and accompanying text. 
 24. See infra notes 169-74 and accompanying text. 
 25. See infra notes 171-73 and accompanying text. 
 26. Id. 
 27. See infra note 174 and accompanying text. 
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This Article explicates my thesis in three parts.  Part II sets forth an 
“intellectual history” of CRT, isolating the central historical and social 
forces that gave rise to its development as a body of jurisprudential 
research.28  Part III discusses both historical and recent insider and external 
critiques of CRT and relates these critiques to the development of critical 
race methodologies.29  Part III offers new perspectives on outsider critiques 
that describe CRT as nihilistic and on insider critiques that bifurcate 
multiplicity theories and class.30  Part IV “introduces” the works of this 
Symposium and connects them to ongoing theoretical projects within 
CRT.31 
II.  CRT:  AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 
Many scholars have devoted attention to analyzing the evolution and 
thematic content of CRT.32  As such, this Part offers only a brief historical 
examination of CRT, highlighting important factors that shaped the early 
interventions and later transformations of CRT. 
The introduction to Critical Race Theory:  The Key Writings That 
Formed the Movement33 provides the most succinct and poignant 
description of CRT.  CRT, the book’s authors observe, represents a 
progressive insurgency within traditional civil rights discourse and a racial 
insurgency within existing progressive legal discourse, such as Critical 
Legal Studies (CLS).34  As the remainder of this Part reveals, CRT has 
agreed with, but departed from, CLS and traditional civil rights discourse in 
many important respects. 
A.  A Racial Intervention in CLS 
CRT developed in the late-1980s at a time when conservative Supreme 
Court doctrine was eroding many of the gains made by the 1960s civil 
rights movement.35  Doctrines such as standing,36 colorblindness,37 and the 
                                                          
 28. See infra Part II. 
 29. See infra Part III. 
 30. Id. 
 31. See infra Part IV. 
 32. See, e.g., RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY:  AN 
INTRODUCTION (2001); CRITICAL RACE THEORY:  THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE 
MOVEMENT xiii-xxxii (Kimberlé Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995) [hereinafter THE KEY 
WRITINGS]; MARI J. MATSUDA, WHERE IS YOUR BODY?:  AND OTHER ESSAYS ON RACE 
GENDER AND THE LAW 47-59 (1996). 
 33. THE KEY WRITINGS, supra note 32, at xiii. 
 34. See id. at xix (observing that CRT represents a “left intervention into race discourse 
and a race intervention into left discourse”). 
 35. Id. at xvi-xvii. 
 36. See generally Girardeau A. Spann, Color-Coded Standing, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 
1422, 1422, 1496 (1995) (critiquing racial disparities in the application of standing doctrine 
that deprive people of color of civil rights remedies and concluding that a showing of 
Supreme Court racial discrimination is inconsequential because it has long served a 
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discriminatory intent rule38 limited access to the Court by subordinate 
groups,39 curtailed the availability of judicial remedies to plaintiffs properly 
before the Court,40 and made it extraordinarily difficult for states and 
Congress to address questions of racial inequality.41  Early Critical Race 
Theorists critically assessed Court doctrine.  Echoing themes in other 
progressive legal discourses, primarily CLS, Critical Race Theorists argued 
that the law reinforces racial hierarchy, reflects the viewpoints of privileged 
classes, serves as a weak vehicle for social change, is indeterminate and 
unable to provide fixed, predictable outcomes for civil rights litigants, and 
is inherently non-neutral (and biased towards the protection of societal 
privilege).42 
While Critical Race Theorists appreciated CLS’s poststructuralist 
questioning of the law and legal reasoning, Critical Race Theorists and 
CLS scholars diverged in one important respect:  while many CLS scholars 
sought to discard using the law as an instrument of progressive social 
change, Critical Race Theorists, recognizing the historical role that law has 
played in the advancement of the material and social status of persons of 
color, exhibited a commitment (in varying degrees) to the institution and 
structure of law.43  In a symposium published by the Harvard Civil Rights-
Civil Liberties Law Review, Critical Race Theorists asserted that the 
“whiteness” of CLS scholars prevented those writers from appreciating the 
value of law and rights discourse to persons of color.44  Although law is 
imperfect, it remains a vehicle for persons of color to demand justice and to 
represent the varied harms of racial subordination.45  As a result, the 
                                                          
majoritarian purpose). 
 37. See Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution Is Color-Blind,” 44 STAN. L. 
REV. 1, 36-37 (1991) (criticizing colorblind constitutional doctrine as perpetuating racial 
hierarchy). 
 38. See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:  Reckoning 
with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 388 (1987) (assessing the discriminatory 
intent rule as limiting racial equality and contending that judicial evaluation of 
governmental action with racially discriminary impact may uncover unconscious racism). 
 39. See Spann, supra note 36, at 1424, 1455 (demonstrating how standing doctrine 
limits access to the courts by persons of color). 
 40. See Lawrence, supra note 38, at 353-54, 376-78 (discussing how the discriminatory 
intent rule sharply curtails the availability of judicial relief in equal protection cases). 
 41. See Darren Lenard Hutchinson, “Unexplainable on Grounds Other Than Race”:  
The Inversion of Privilege and Subordination in Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 2003 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 615, 646, 654 (discussing the impact of colorblindness upon remedial usages of 
race). 
 42. Angela P. Harris, Foreword:  A Jurisprudence of Reconstruction, 82 CAL. L. REV. 
741, 745-50 (1994). 
 43. See id. at 750-51 (discussing the rift between CRT and CLS over efficacy of rights). 
 44. Symposium, Minority Critiques of the Critical Legal Studies Movement, 22 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 297 (1987). 
 45. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, The Ethereal Scholar:  Does Critical Legal Studies 
Have What Minorities Want?, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 301, 303-07 (1987) (arguing that 
persons of color, unlike CLS scholars, value rights due to their vulnerable status in racial 
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experiences of subordinate persons reflect a “dual consciousness”46—a 
simultaneous respect and disdain for law and legal institutions.  Patricia 
Williams, for example, argues that: 
To say that blacks never fully believed in rights is true; yet it is also true 
that blacks believed in them so much and so hard that we gave them life 
where there was none before.  We held onto them, put the hope of them 
into our wombs, and mothered them—not just the notion of them.  We 
nurtured rights and gave rights life.  And this was not the dry process of 
reification, from which life is drained and reality fades as the cement of 
conceptual determinism hardens round—but its opposite. This was the 
resurrection of life from 400-year-old ashes; the parthenogenesis of 
unfertilized hope.47 
The desire to integrate postmodern skepticism toward the law within a 
modern framework of law and reason thus became a central theme in 
critical race scholarship.48  And as Angela Harris has persuasively argued, 
rather than resisting this inherent contradiction and attempting to decide 
“which” strand (postmodern or modern, deconstructionist or 
reconstructionist) should dominate critical race analysis, Critical Race 
Theorists should “inhabit that very tension.”49 
Critical Race Theorists have largely followed Harris’ thoughtful advice.  
While Critical Race Theorists continue to unveil the malleability of law, 
the intractability of racism, and the socially constructed nature of race, they 
also offer doctrinal and policy reforms in a host of legal contexts.50 
B. A Progressive Intervention in Civil Rights Discourse 
Although Critical Race Theorists appreciate the value of law in the 
betterment of the lives of persons of color, they also understand that law is 
a problematic instrument for progressive social movements.51  Some 
                                                          
hierarchy). 
 46. See Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom:  Critical Legal Studies and 
Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 341 (1987) (“The minority experience of 
dual consciousness accommodates both the idea of legal indeterminacy as well as the core 
belief in a liberating law that transcends indeterminacy.”). 
 47. Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes:  Reconstructing Ideals From Deconstructed 
Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401, 430 (1987) (internal citation omitted). 
 48. See Harris, supra note 42, at 745-55 (discussing the tension in CRT that results 
from its simultaneous embrace of CLS and traditional liberal discourse). 
 49. Id. at 760 (internal citation omitted). 
 50. See, e.g., Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies:  Women 
of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1480-82 (1991) 
(proposing an equal protection remedy for the criminalization of prenatal drug use among 
black women by linking governmental obligations to the rights of privacy and racial 
equality); Mari J. Matsuda, Voices of America:  Accent, Antidiscrimination Law, and a 
Jurisprudence for the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1329, 1383 (1991) (arguing that 
antidiscrimination law should recognize claims of “accent discrimination”). 
 51. See Harris, supra note 42, at 749-50 (discussing disenchantment with the law 
among Critical Race Theorists). 
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Critical Race Theorists even question whether the United States can ever 
transcend its racism.52  While Critical Race Theorists understand that the 
establishment of formal equality has improved the status and material 
conditions of persons of color, formal equality has a limited impact.53  A 
regime of formal equality cannot complete the project of racial equality 
because it:  (1) does not address the material harms caused by racism; 
(2) does not disturb subtle or unconscious racism; (3) does not treat as 
impermissible laws that negatively impact subordinate groups (regardless 
of the intent of lawmakers); and (4) treats as suspicious, explicit or 
remedial usages of race.54 
The Court’s equal protection jurisprudence illuminates the severe 
limitations of a regime of formal equality and its adverse effects upon 
racial justice.  In a series of decisions, the Court has construed the Equal 
Protection Clause as prohibiting race-based state action.55  In order to 
justify race consciousness, the governmental actor must provide a 
compelling justification for its use of race and demonstrate that the 
classification is narrowly connected to the policy end.56  The Court’s 
colorblindness doctrine certainly helped persons of color when laws overtly 
and intentionally sought to subordinate them.  In other words, 
colorblindness was a sensible doctrine during an historical era where 
racism was openly encoded in law and policy. 
Today, however, most state actors do not explicitly legislate or 
promulgate policies on the basis of race.57  The Civil Rights Movement 
created a change in social structure; American society now disfavors race-
conscious state action.58  Consequently, the only laws or policies that 
openly utilize race are typically remedial in nature.  Contemporary race-
conscious laws seek to benefit—rather than harm—socially marginalized 
                                                          
 52. Derrick Bell, Racial Realism, 24 CONN. L. REV. 363 (1992). 
 53. See Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment:  
Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1378 
(1988) (“[T]he attainment of formal equality is not the end of the story.  Racial hierarchy 
cannot be cured by the move to facial race-neutrality in the laws that structure the economic, 
political, and social lives of Black people.”). 
 54. See Hutchinson, supra note 41, at 637-81 (demonstrating how equal protection 
doctrine legitimates “neutral” laws that harm socially disadvantaged groups but invalidates 
“facially discriminatory” laws that seek to eradicate subordination). 
 55. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 236 (1995) (“Racial 
classifications are simply too pernicious to permit any but the most exact connection 
between justification and classification.”). 
 56. Id. 
 57. See Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Effects of Intent:  Do We Know 
How Legal Standards Work?, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1151, 1169 (1991) (“Where 
discrimination is illegal or socially disapproved, social scientists predict that it will be 
practiced only when it is possible to do so covertly and indirectly.”) (citation omitted). 
 58. See Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects:  The Evolving Forms 
of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1135 (1997) (observing that 
United States culture embraces equal opportunity). 
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groups.59  White state actors who implement affirmative action plans do not 
consider race to subjugate whites, but to remedy the harms caused by racial 
subordination and to diversify important social institutions.  Nevertheless, 
the Court’s colorblindness doctrine demands symmetry:  governmental race 
consciousness requires strict scrutiny regardless of whether it seeks to harm 
or to benefit persons of color.60  This lack of context in the Court’s race 
jurisprudence has made it extremely difficult for the states and Congress to 
remedy the effects of racial discrimination.61  The Court has utilized the 
strict scrutiny doctrine primarily to strike down or to limit remedies rather 
than to affirm them.62 
Concurrent with its application of colorblindness, the Court also treats as 
presumptively constitutional laws or policies that are facially neutral but 
which disparately affect disadvantaged classes.63  Although Court doctrine 
permits the introduction of statistical impact evidence to prove 
discriminatory intent, the Court has invariably discounted impact studies in 
equal protection (and statutory) antidiscrimination cases and has made it 
clear that impact alone, disconnected from a finding of intent, does not 
substantiate a claim of discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause.64 
The discriminatory intent rule has placed high barriers before civil rights 
litigants.65  This rule essentially requires that a plaintiff present a court with 
“smoking gun” evidence at a time when overt manifestations of racial bias 
are highly suspicious and well-policed.  As a consequence, the Court has 
rejected claims of discrimination where discriminatory patterns mirror 
historical legacies of extreme racial subjugation,66 where parties present 
highly sophisticated statistical studies documenting the influence of race in 
                                                          
 59. See Girardeau A. Spann, Affirmative Action and Discrimination, 39 HOW. L.J. 1, 5 
(1995) (describing affirmative action as “the race-conscious allocation of resources 
motivated by an intent to benefit racial minorities”). 
 60. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 224 (“[T]he standard of review under the Equal Protection 
Clause is not dependent on the race of those burdened or benefited by a particular 
classification.”) (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 494 (1989) 
(plurality opinion)). 
 61. See Spann, supra note 59, at 65 (arguing that the Supreme Court’s failure to 
recognize motive in the context of affirmative action disregards “the only distinction that 
exists between affirmative action and discrimination”). 
 62. See id. at 65-66 (discussing the Court’s hostility toward affirmative action). 
 63. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (acknowledging the 
reluctance of the Court to declare laws unconstitutional based on the presence of a racially 
disproportionate impact, without assessing the presence of a racially discriminatory 
purpose). 
 64. See id. (holding that despite discriminatory impact, equal protection plaintiffs must 
prove intentional discrimination). 
 65. See, e.g., Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal Protection, 41 STAN. L. REV. 
1105, 1113 (1989) (noting that under the specific intent standard, evidence of disparate 
effect is of little use to plaintiffs). 
 66. See, e.g., Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977) 
(dismissing probative value of racial impact in a housing discrimination case). 
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state action,67 and where the discriminatory patterns themselves are clearly 
foreseeable.68  Finding no intentional discrimination, the Court has applied 
low-level rational basis review and largely upheld challenged policies in 
equal protection impact cases.69 
Together, the colorblindness and impact rules demonstrate the pitfalls of 
an exclusive reliance on formal equality as a vehicle for racial justice.  The 
Court, wedded to the notion of colorblindness, applies strict scrutiny to 
governmental policies aimed to alleviate the harms caused by racism, but it 
remains deferential in the face of laws that, while facially neutral, 
disparately affect historically protected groups.  These doctrines leave 
subordinate classes vulnerable to facially neutral—though harmful—state 
action, and they prevent state actors from remedying the discrimination 
these groups continue to face.70 
In an effort to interject progressive values into the terrain of civil rights 
jurisprudence, many Critical Race Theorists have criticized formal equality 
regimes.71  Their research has pushed legal theorists to consider solutions to 
the problem of racial inequality that do more than simply establish formal 
rules that prohibit discriminatory acts by state actors. 
III.  CRT:  INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL CRITIQUES 
Cultural critic bell hooks has observed that progressive social 
movements mature in response to critical inquiry from within their ranks.  
Hooks notes that “any progressive political movement grows and matures 
only to the degree that it passionately welcomes and encourages, in both 
theory and practice, diversity of opinion, new ideas, critical exchange, and 
dissent.”72  This assertion certainly holds true in the context of CRT, as its 
evolution has depended largely upon very vigorous internal criticism.  
Although Critical Race Theorists have not always passionately welcomed 
                                                          
 67. See Sheila Foster, Intent and Incoherence, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1065, 1073 (1998) 
(critiquing the Court’s dismissal of “sophisticated and comprehensive statistical evidence” 
in equal protection litigation). 
 68. See Personnel Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) (upholding state 
preference for veterans in employment settings despite the foreseeable, gross disparate 
effect of the policy upon women). 
 69. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 250-52 (1976) (applying rational 
basis review and upholding municipal hiring policy with a disparate racial effect). 
 70. See Hutchinson, supra note 41, at 637-73 (providing an extensive critique of this 
particular aspect of equal protection doctrine). 
 71. See, e.g., Crenshaw, supra note 53, at 1384 (discussing the symbolism behind 
removing formal barriers, and the unlikelihood that this action would change hierarchical 
relationships between whites and blacks “until the way in which race consciousness 
perpetuates norms that legitimate Black subordination is revealed”). 
 72. See hooks, supra note 4, at 65-66 (noting how the early feminist movement did not 
welcome discussion on race and racism). 
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such critiques,73 the relative openness of CRT has allowed for substantial 
innovation of its intellectual agenda. 
Internal critics have also challenged Critical Race Theorists, and their 
arguments have shaped the direction of critical race analysis as well—if 
only by generating rebuttals to these very critiques.  This Part discusses the 
influence of internal and external critiques upon critical race analysis and 
then responds directly to some important critiques with which Critical Race 
Theorists have not yet exhaustively engaged. 
A. Innovation in CRT:  Reckoning with Internal Critiques 
Much of the evolution and development of CRT has resulted from 
internal critiques of the theory.  The predominant internal critiques of CRT 
focus on questions of multiplicity, essentialism, and exclusion.  
Specifically, these critiques have argued that Critical Race Theorists 
essentialize persons of color by omitting gender, sexuality, and class from 
analysis, thereby excluding women of color74 and gays, lesbians, and 
bisexuals of color.75  Other internal critics have contested the “black/white 
paradigm” of racial discourse, arguing that CRT focuses primarily on 
black/white racial issues, to the exclusion of Native American, Asian 
American and Latino concerns.76 
1. Intersectionality:  the race/gender critiques 
The feminist critiques of CRT have contributed heavily to the concept of 
subordination among Critical Race Theorists.  Leading Critical Race 
Feminists include Kimberlé Crenshaw,77 Angela Harris,78 Dorothy 
                                                          
 73. Phillips, supra note 3, at 1250-51. 
 74. See generally CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM:  A READER (Adrien Katherine Wing ed., 2d 
ed. 2003) [hereinafter CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM] (developing areas of legal scholarship 
where purportedly neutral analyses excluded the experiences and realities of women of 
color). 
 75. See Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Ignoring the Sexualization of Race:  
Heteronormativity, Critical Race Theory, and Anti-Racist Politics, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 7 
(1999) (arguing that the work of CRT scholars who do not perform a multidimensional 
analysis perpetuates heterosexism and the marginalization of gay, lesbian, bisexual, and 
transgender people of color). 
 76. See Juan F. Perea, The Black/White Binary Paradigm of Race:  The “Normal 
Science” of American Racial Thought, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1213, 1253 (1997) (noting that civil 
rights discourse and struggle affects everyone and should therefore include everyone); 
Robert S. Chang, Toward an Asian American Legal Scholarship:  Critical Race Theory, 
Post-Structuralism, and Narrative Space, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1241, 1267 (1993) (stating that 
the omission of Asian American perspectives from CRT forecloses a more nuanced 
understanding of racism in the United States). 
 77. See, e.g., Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins:  Intersectionality, 
Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1242-43 
(1991) (asserting that intersecting patterns of racism and sexism frequently produce violence 
against women of color). 
 78. See, e.g., Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 
STAN. L. REV. 581, 585 (1990) (discussing how feminist legal theorists privilege the 
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Roberts,79 Berta Hernández-Truyol,80 Leti Volpp,81 and Adrien Wing.82  
These scholars have contested the single-issue paradigms of antiracist and 
feminist discourse that focuses exclusively on race or gender as dimensions 
of subordination, to the exclusion of the intersection of race and gender 
analysis.83 
When Critical Race Theorists eliminate gender from their analysis, the 
resulting theories rest on the experiences of, and respond to the needs of, 
men of color.84  Furthermore, essentialist racial discourse obfuscates the 
multiple harms that racism causes.  Due to the “intersection” of racism and 
patriarchy, racism has gendered effects, and patriarchy exists in a racialized 
context.85  Thus, intersectionality scholars have examined the structural 
elements of race, and they have also extended their rich analysis to 
doctrinal and policy contexts.86  As a result of intersectional analysis, 
feminist concerns occupy a prominent space within contemporary CRT, 
and the work of these theorists has influenced legal actors.87 
                                                          
“abstract and unitary voice,” and silence the voices of women of color). 
 79. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 50, at 1424 (criticizing feminist literature on 
reproductive rights for adopting a white, middle class perspective, and neglecting the 
concerns of poor women of color). 
 80. See, e.g., Berta Esperanza Hernández-Truyol, Borders (En)Gendered:  
Normativities, Latinas, and a LatCrit Paradigm, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 882, 921 (1997) 
(recognizing that Latina inclusion requires a non-essentialist model that incorporates race, 
ethnicity, nationhood, gender, and culture). 
 81. See, e.g., Leti Volpp, (Mis)Identifying Culture:  Asian Women and the “Cultural 
Defense”, 17 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 57, 93-94 (1994) (arguing that any analysis of cultural 
defenses must consider gendered power relationships within communities as well as cultural 
differences between communities). 
 82. See, e.g., Adrien Katherine Wing, Introduction to CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM, supra 
note 74, at 7 (arguing that Critical Race Feminism enhanced CRT by articulating that 
“women of color are not merely white women plus color or men of color plus gender”). 
 83. See Mari J. Matsuda, Beside My Sister, Facing the Enemy:  Legal Theory Out of 
Coalition, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1183, 1188-89 (1991) (urging scholars to work in a coalition, to 
study patterns of oppression, and to recognize that “all forms of subordination are 
interlocking and mutually reinforcing”). 
 84. See Crenshaw, supra note 77, at 1252 (asserting that the “specific raced and 
gendered experiences [of men of color and white women], although intersectional, often 
define as well as confine the interests of the entire group”). 
 85. See Leti Volpp, Feminism Versus Multiculturalism, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1181, 
1207-08 (2001) (criticizing feminist scholars in the United States for failing to address 
various social, political, and economic issues, including racism, that shape gender 
subordination). 
 86. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 50, at 1428-36 (discussing gender and race in the 
context of criminal law enforcement); Crenshaw, supra note 77, at 1251-82 (discussing 
gender and race in the context of gender violence policy). 
 87. See, e.g., Lam v. Univ. of Haw., 40 F.3d 1551, 1562 (9th Cir. 1994) (drawing on 
Crenshaw’s intersectionality theory to argue that attempts to “bisect a person’s identity” to 
prove that gender or race-based discrimination would distort the court’s analysis of the 
particular nature of discrimination against women of color). 
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2. Multidimensionality:  race, gender, sexuality, and class 
The feminist critiques of CRT have led to additional intellectual 
inquiries.  Specifically, the intersectionality critiques have influenced 
scholars whose work analyzes the relationship between sexuality, race, 
class, and gender.88  The “race-sexuality” critics have endeavored to 
advance the intersectional analysis both substantially and conceptually. 
The race-sexuality theorists have advanced intersectional analysis 
substantively by considering the interaction of race and sexual identity, 
which intersectionality theorists largely ignore.89  The race-sexuality 
theorists, however, have done more than simply insert another category of 
experience, such as sexual orientation, into pre-existing intersectionality 
theory.  Rather, the race-sexuality theorists have tried to advance the 
conceptual lens of race utilized by CRT beyond the important insights that 
Critical Race Feminists have made.  For example, while Critical Race 
Feminists have viewed intersectionality as a condition that affects the 
“multiply burdened,”90 primarily or exclusively, multidimensionality 
scholars have treated multiplicity as a “universal” concept—one facing all 
members of subordinate groups.91  Thus, the interaction of whiteness and 
gayness has important implications for racial theory, as much as the 
interaction of blackness and womanhood. 
By interrogating the convergence of privilege and subordination, rather 
than only “intersecting” subordination, multidimensionality theorists have 
uncovered the inherent contradictions in the arguments of essentialist 
scholars who view multiplicity theories as destructive to progressive social 
movements.92  Once we treat multiplicity as a universal concept, then no 
group can claim to represent a “pure” race claim or to merit a central 
                                                          
 88. See generally Hutchinson, supra note 75, at 9-17 (advocating a multidimensional 
analysis of oppression that includes the diverse ways in which privilege and disadvantage 
intersect); Francisco Valdes, Queer Margins, Queer Ethics:  A Call to Account for Race and 
Ethnicity in the Law, Theory, and Politics of “Sexual Orientation,” 48 HASTINGS L.J. 1293, 
1338-40 (1997) (urging scholars to go beyond intersectionality, and look at the complex 
interplay of racism, sexism and heterosexism as mutually-reinforcing oppressions). 
 89. I have written extensively on the distinctions between intersectionality and 
multidimensionality, and I have theorized the latter.  See, e.g., Darren Lenard Hutchinson, 
Identity Crisis:  “Intersectionality,” “Multidimensionality,” and the Development of an 
Adequate Theory of Subordination, 6 MICH. J. RACE & L. 285, 307-13 (2001) [hereinafter 
“Hutchinson, Identity Crises”] (explaining how multidimensionality goes beyond 
intersectionality to recognize heterosexism and universality); Hutchinson, supra note 75, at 
9-17 (discussing substantive and conceptual similarities and differences between the two 
theories). 
 90. See, e.g., Wing, supra note 82, at 7-8 (noting that Critical Race Feminism 
concentrates on “those women of color who face multiple discrimination”). 
 91. See Hutchinson, supra note 75, at 15-16 (arguing that a multidimensional analysis 
must recognize the role privilege plays in the lives of subordinated groups). 
 92. See id. at 16-17 (arguing that a multidimensional approach recognizes that, for 
example, race and gender are integral issues to gay rights because although a gay white man 
may suffer from heterosexism, he is privileged by gender and race). 
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position in antiracist politics and theory.93  Arguments to the contrary are 
both inaccurate and discriminatory.  Today, many Critical Race Theorists 
have recognized multidimensionality as a natural progression of 
intersectionality.94 
3. Multiracial politics 
A third area of critical race innovation involves multiracial politics.  
Internal critics have argued that racial discourse in the United States fixates 
upon black/white racial issues, thereby marginalizing Latino, Native 
American, and Asian American experiences.95  Empirically, this 
observation is indisputable.  Race theorists lack a full understanding of the 
breadth of racial injustice.  The inclusion of the experiences of Latinos, 
Native Americans, and Asian Americans in racial discourse can improve 
CRT in several ways.  First, a multiracial discourse permits a full 
accounting of the problem of racial inequality and allows for the 
construction of adequate remedies for racial subordination.96  Although all 
people of color suffer racism, often in similar ways, racial hierarchies 
impact communities of color in diverse ways.  A narrow focus on 
black/white subjugation severely limits the reach of antiracist remedies. 
The black/white paradigm also prevents persons of color from engaging 
in coalition politics.97  By treating racism as a problem that affects blacks 
primarily (or exclusively), racial discourse in the United States divides 
persons of color who could align to create formidable political forces in the 
battle for racial justice. 
Binary racial discourse also causes persons of color to compete for the 
attention of whites, as marginalized racial groups treat racial justice as a 
                                                          
 93. See id. (suggesting that a multidisciplinary approach avoids privileging some 
experiences over others); see also Nancy Ehrenreich, Subordination and Symbiosis:  
Mechanisms of Mutual Support Between Subordinating Systems, 71 UMKC L. REV. 251, 
275 (2002) (reasoning that it is unlikely that someone would be subjugated in every possible 
social hierarchy because of the multiple ways in which an individual can experience 
privilege or subordination). 
 94. See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Iglesias & Francisco Valdes, LatCrit at Five:  
Institutionalizing a Postsubordination Future, 78 DENV. U. L. REV. 1249, 1267 (2001) 
(describing multidimensionality as advancing prior theories such as intersectionality in 
qualitative and quantitative ways). 
 95. See discussion supra note 76 (criticizing the black/white paradigm as 
underinclusive and of limited utility). 
 96. See Chris K. Iijima, The Era of We-Construction:  Reclaiming the Politics of Asian 
Pacific American Identity and Reflections on the Critique of the Black/White Paradigm, 29 
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 47, 68-69 (1997) (describing how immigration and the ensuing 
changes in the racial makeup of U.S. society have exposed the ways in which the 
black/white paradigm fails to provide an appropriate analytical framework). 
 97. See Perea, supra note 76, at 1256 (arguing that multiracial coalition politics depends 
upon mutual understanding among persons of color and that the black/white paradigm 
prevents the development of such understanding). 
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zero-sum game.98  Instead of recognizing the pervasiveness and complexity 
of racial injuries, binary racial discourse leads to the tyranny of oppression 
ranking and to competing demands for centrality in a marginalized space of 
racial victimization. 
Recently, Critical Race Theorists, responding to the multiracial critics, 
have attempted to contextualize binary racial discourse.  Devon Carbado, 
for example, recognizes the existence of the so-called black/white 
paradigm but pushes its critics to consider that this paradigm privileges 
whites and subordinates blacks.99  Because blacks and whites are situated 
differently with respect to the black/white paradigm, their investment in 
binary racial discourse likely serves diverging interests.100  If whites created 
the paradigm, then directing multiracial critiques toward black scholars 
might be misguided. 
Furthermore, several scholars, including those who reject binary racial 
politics, have documented the unique experiences of blacks in the 
construction of racism in the United States.101  “Black exceptionalism”102 
might provide a historical and sociological explanation for the 
predominance of black/white racial discourse. 
Also, resistance to multiracial discourse among blacks might exist 
because non-black persons of color often benefit from white supremacy.  
That is, non-black persons of color sometimes align themselves 
ideologically and culturally with whites to elevate their status in a racially 
hierarchical society.103  The embrace of racial hierarchy among people of 
                                                          
 98. See Manning Marable, Beyond Racial Identity Politics:  Toward a Liberation 
Theory for Multicultural Democracy, in BEYOND BLACK AND WHITE:  TRANSFORMING 
AFRICAN-AMERICAN POLITICS 185, 190-91 (1995) (describing how this approach assumes 
that one group can win only if another loses, which prevents groups from recognizing the 
parallels in their experiences). 
 99. See Devon W. Carbado, Race to the Bottom, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1283, 1306 (2002) 
(urging critics to recognize the asymmetrical racially discriminatory relationship inherent in 
the black/white paradigm, where whites are at the top and blacks are at the bottom). 
 100. Carbado argues that blacks adhere to the paradigm in order to discuss “Black 
exceptionalism”—the unique harms endured by blacks in a system of white supremacy—
while whites promote white exceptionalism—the racist notion that blackness is 
diametrically opposed to whiteness.  See id. at 1311 (discussing the different roles of whites 
and blacks with respect to the black/white paradigm). 
 101. See Frank H. Wu, Neither Black Nor White:  Asian Americans and Affirmative 
Action, 15 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 225, 245 (1995) (discussing a unique continuing legacy 
of racism against African Americans, including chattel slavery, Jim Crow laws, and 
institutional racism). 
 102. See Leslie Espinoza & Angela P. Harris, Embracing the Tar-Baby–LatCrit Theory 
and the Sticky Mess of Race, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1585, 1596 (1997) (coining the term “black 
exceptionalism” to denote the idea that “African Americans play a unique and central role in 
American social, political, cultural, and economic life, and have done so since the nation’s 
founding”). 
 103. See Carbado, supra note 99, at 1310 (recognizing that a racial group may attempt to 
distance itself from other racial groups for pragmatic political reasons, or to engage the legal 
system on its own terms). 
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color and white-supremacist privileging (even if shifting and extremely 
limited) of non-black communities of color impede the willingness of 
blacks to engage in multiracial discourse. 
Furthermore, black experiences are relevant to the experiences of other 
persons of color for two reasons.  First, anti-black racism provides an 
institutional and historical framework for the subordination of non-black 
persons of color.104  Much of the racial hierarchy in the United States was 
concretized during slavery—though not exclusively.105  The formation of a 
rigid racial caste structure in the black/white context legitimizes racist 
practices against all persons of color.106  Second, persons of color do not 
exist in mutually exclusive groups.  Latino communities, for example, have 
large populations of persons of African descent; thus, it is difficult to 
bifurcate Latino and black experiences.107  Abolishing the black/white 
paradigm, therefore, might preclude analysis of the unique experiences 
facing black Latinos. 
Ultimately, however, the exclusive deployment of a binary black/white 
paradigm artificially narrows racial discourse and harms racial justice 
efforts.  In order to construct adequate antiracist theories and to develop 
effective remedies for racial injustice, Critical Race Theorists must 
excavate the multidimensional harms that racial injustice causes, including 
harms that are racial but not endured by blacks.  Furthermore, progressive 
racial politics can only survive with broad political support.  The most 
likely support for progressive racial change comes from persons of color.  
Yet, the deep divisions that result from binary racial politics hinders the 
formation of helpful antiracist alliances.  Finally, a multiracial discourse 
may help blacks demonstrate the pervasiveness of racial inequality.  Whites 
tend to view racism as a relic of prior generations, and they often respond 
to blacks’ claims of ongoing racial injustice with suspicion.108  Moreover, 
                                                          
 104. See, e.g., Janine Young Kim, Note, Are Asians Black?:  The Asian-American Civil 
Rights Agenda and the Contemporary Significance of the Black/White Paradigm, 108 YALE 
L.J. 2385, 2400-01 (1999) (arguing that the paradigm is integral to understanding how 
power and domination create racial hierarchies, and how non-black groups’ histories 
intersect with the history of African Americans). 
 105. See id. at 2400 (noting that the most vivid example of white supremacy, “[t]he 
history of the kidnapping, enslavement, and subhuman treatment of Africans by White 
European Americans,” is historically linked to the birth of the nation). 
 106. See id. at 2400-01 (recognizing that current racial hierarchies arise from the legacy 
of African American subjugation and its intersection with the histories of other groups). 
 107. See generally Tanya Katerí Hernández, Multiracial Matrix:  The Role of Race 
Ideology in the Enforcement of Antidiscrimination Laws, A United States-Latin America 
Comparison, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1093 (2002) (comparing U.S. and Latin American models 
of race, and discussing how racial classifications exist even in the absence of any public 
focus on race). 
 108. See Barbara J. Flagg, “Was Blind But Now I See”:  White Race Consciousness and 
the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 981 (1993) (arguing that 
whites tend to believe that race discrimination is a thing of the past, that the situation has 
improved, and that race-neutrality is pervasive). 
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in a white-supremacist culture, binary racial discourse obscures the 
experiences of discrimination experienced by Latinos and Asian 
Americans.109  As a result, whites argue that blacks should emulate “model 
minorities,” usually Asian Americans, who either do not suffer from racism 
or do not believe that racism injures them enough to oppose it on a political 
level.110  Binary racial discourse therefore allows whites to discredit blacks’ 
claims of racism by offering Asian Americans as proof that the United 
States has eradicated racial injustice, or that blacks can easily overcome 
what “little” racism still exists.  Multiracial discourse, however, offers a 
powerful rebuttal to this negative and deceitful discourse.  By portraying 
the complexity of racial inequality, Critical Race Theorists can counter a 
white-supremacist narrative that disparages blacks’ assertions of racial 
injustice by deploying model minority constructs.111 
4. Progressive race blindness 
A more recent discussion within CRT surrounds the embrace of race 
consciousness among Critical Race Theorists.112  Unlike conservatives who 
critique race consciousness to oppose remedies for racial injustice, internal 
critics who favor the abolition of race possess liberal and progressive 
credentials.  The “progressive race blindness” critics argue that because 
race is socially constructed, Critical Race Theorists can discard it as an 
element of identity and theory.113  Furthermore, the progressive race 
blindness critics point to the negative uses of race and argue that Critical 
                                                          
 109. See discussion supra note 76 (observing the limitations of the black/white 
paradigm). 
 110. See Wu, supra note 101, at 239-40 (discussing how by becoming like whites, 
Asians are now expected to acquiesce to white supremacy). 
 111. See id. at 244-46 (critiquing the model minority myth as ignoring historical 
discrimination, differential racial experiences, differences among Asian communities, and 
actual experiences of discrimination). 
 112. See, e.g., Reginald Leamon Robinson, The Shifting Race-Consciousness Matrix and 
the Multiracial Category Movement, 20 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 231 (2000) (asserting that 
the only reason race exists is because people repeatedly and consciously think about race).  
Robinson argues that racism and white supremacy stem from race consciousness and related 
behavior.  Id. at 233-34.  See also Richard T. Ford, Race As Culture? Why Not?, 47 UCLA 
L. REV. 1803, 1806 (2000) (explaining that race consciousness proponents reject the notion 
that race does not exist and instead purport the existence of racial categories that delineate 
political and social groups); K. Anthony Appiah, Race, Culture, Identity:  Misunderstood 
Connections, in K. ANTHONY APPIAH & AMY GUTMAN, COLOR CONSCIOUSNESS:  THE 
POLITICAL MORALITY OF RACE 30, 31 (1996) (arguing that in order to diffuse racism people 
must first overcome their own racial identities); e. christi cunningham, The “Racing” Cause 
of Action and the Identity Formally Known as Race:  The Road to Tamazunchale, 30 
RUTGERS L.J. 707, 713 (1999) (contending that race matters because race identity can be 
both useful in fighting racism as well as a tool for oppression).  I have written extensively 
on these critiques in another article.  See Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Progressive Race 
Blindness?:  Individual Identity, Group Politics, and Reform, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1455 
(2001). 
 113. Hutchinson, supra note 112, at 1459-60. 
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Race Theorists should abandon race-talk.114  Progressive race blindness 
theorists typically believe (though they do not speak uniformly) that 
because racism has served as a source of deprivation and brutality, people 
of color perpetuate their own marginalization when they continue to 
construct their identities around race.115  Some progressive race blindness 
critics have even argued that race consciousness, rather than structural 
racism and economic injustice, causes cycles of poverty among persons of 
color.116  When persons of color embrace race consciousness, they accept a 
script of racial subordination and, performing their assigned roles in racial 
hierarchy, “co-create” poverty.117  Other advocates of progressive race 
blindness argue that race consciousness breeds essentialism, social 
divisions, and alienation.118 
Several Critical Race Theorists have responded to the progressive race 
blindness critiques.119  The primary responses acknowledge the social 
construction of race but also assert that race, although socially constructed, 
materially affects the lives of persons of color and that the deconstruction 
of race cannot eradicate the existence of racial hierarchy and inequality.120 
Critical Race Theorists also have argued that race blindness deprives 
persons of color of an organizational tool to contest racism.  Without the 
language of race, persons of color cannot adequately describe their 
experiences with racism or generate political activism to contest racist 
institutions.121  By framing race consciousness as inherently negative—a 
contradictory stance to take if one seriously views race as socially 
constructed, malleable, and capable of discarding—progressive race 
                                                          
 114. See id. at 1461 (explaining that progressive race blindness advocates believe that 
the concept and use of race weakens people’s identities and promotes “inferiority, 
victimization, and helplessness among persons of color”). 
 115. See id. (discussing the views of progressive race blindness theorists such as e. 
christi cunningham and Reginald Leamon Robinson). 
 116. See, e.g., Reginald Leamon Robinson, The Underclass and the Role of Race 
Consciousness:  A New Age Critique of Black Wealth/White Wealth and American 
Apartheid, 34 IND. L. REV. 1377, 1432 (2001) (proposing that individuals use their own 
“self-empowering philosophy” to experience either poverty or wealth). 
 117. Id. 
 118. See Hutchinson, supra note 112, at 1461-62 (noting that progressive race blindness 
advocates believe that race consciousness alienates individuals from their “true” self and 
alienates communities by dividing the population). 
 119. See generally id. at 1465-75 (refuting progressive race blindness scholars’ claim 
that race consciousness is dangerous ); Hernández-Truyol, supra note 80, at 921 (discussing 
the Latina/o experience of race, ethnicity, and culture in America and comparing that 
American experience to one in a Latin American country); Jayne Chong-Soon Lee, 
Navigating the Topology of Race, 46 STAN. L. REV. 747, 747 (1994) (asserting that fighting 
racism requires a recognition of the various definitions of race and an understanding that the 
meaning of race continually shifts). 
 120. See Hutchinson, supra note 112, at 1473-75 (critiquing Robinson for failing to 
recognize that racism is structural; thus, even if people were able to erase race from their 
consciousness, the negative and persistent impact of racism would still be present). 
 121. See Lee, supra note 119, at 772 (arguing that “race” unites communities of color). 
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blindness scholars ignore its potentially positive uses for persons of 
color.122 
Finally, advocates of progressive race blindness ignore the 
multidimensionality of subordination in their efforts to rid society of race, 
while remaining neutral toward other socially constructed categories of 
identity, such as gender and sexuality.123  Because identity categories are 
interconnected, it is impossible to abolish race without considering the 
identity categories that coexist with and that contextualize racial identity.124 
B. Backlash Against CRT:  External Critiques 
During November 1997, Yale Law School hosted a conference that 
commemorated the tenth anniversary of the earliest published work in 
CRT.  The Yale conference took place in the context of very visible, 
public, and strident critiques of CRT. 
In an essay published at that time by the New Republic, for example, 
United States Circuit Judge Richard A. Posner argues that Critical Race 
Theorists appear to be “whiners and wolf-criers,” “labile and intellectually 
limited,” “divisive,” and “weak.”125 Posner asserts that Critical Race 
theorists’ scholarship is “inaccurate” and marred by “extremism . . . 
paranoia . . . hysteria . . . and irrationalism.”126  At the conclusion of his 
essay, which is ostensibly a review of Daniel Farber and Suzanna Sherry’s 
Beyond All Reason,127 a critique of progressive scholarship, including CRT, 
Posner charges that CRT “is a disgrace to legal education” and an 
“embarrassment to sober liberal egalitarians . . . .”128  These impassioned 
reflections come from the same individual who believes that “model” 
scholarship must, among other things, be “unstrident [and] 
unpolemical . . . .”129  Either Posner has discarded his model, or there is 
something inherent to CRT that renders “model” criticism ineffective and 
destabilized. 
United States Circuit Judge Alex Kozinski offers another spirited, 
though less inflamed, critique of CRT in the New York Times.130  Like 
                                                          
 122. Id. 
 123. See Hutchinson, supra note 112, at 1469-71 (noting that progressive race blindness 
scholars tailor many of their arguments toward persons of color, implying that race 
consciousness is a problem among persons of color). 
 124. Id. at 1470. 
 125. Richard A. Posner, The Skin Trade, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 13, 1997, at 40. 
 126. Id. 
 127. See generally DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON:  THE 
RADICAL ASSAULT ON TRUTH IN AMERICAN LAW (1997). 
 128. Posner, supra note 125, at 40. 
 129. Richard A. Posner, Should There Be Homosexual Marriage?  And If So, Who 
Should Decide?, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1578, 1578 (1997). 
 130. Alex Kozinski, Bending the Law:  Are Radical Multiculturalists Poisoning Young 
Legal Minds?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1997, § 7, at 46.   
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Posner, Kozinski purports to review Farber and Sherry’s work, but he 
directs most of his efforts toward criticizing CRT de novo.  Kozinski 
asserts that “radical multiculturalists,”131 among whom he includes Critical 
Race Theorists, are “loud and militant” and “they brand those who oppose 
them as sexist, racist or worse.”132 
As this cursory review indicates, the conservative critics and their 
critiques of CRT are well-placed.  Moreover, the critiques tend to depart 
from a strict analytical engagement with the particulars of critical race 
scholarship, and degenerate into personal, often vitriolic, attacks.  Yet, 
these facts alone do not completely explain the concern these critiques 
engendered.  Rather, the most troubling aspect of the conservative critiques 
of CRT surrounds the many distortions they make concerning the general 
themes of critical race scholarship and about the analyses of specific works 
within this vast body of diverse literature.  The articles tend to follow a 
common, almost predictable, pattern with regard to their observations about 
CRT proper.  As the critiques go, CRT is:  (1) a collection of stories, 
narratives, and anecdotes, usually poorly written;133 (2) “nihilistic” and 
irreversibly cynical with respect to the possibility of racial reconciliation;134 
and (3) anti-foundational, completely disavowing claims of truth and 
objectivity and the possibility of legal change.135 
Typically, the conservative critiques cite the work of particular Critical 
Race Theorists to “prove” their claims about the general themes of CRT.  
These critiques invariably center upon the work of a few prominent 
theorists.  Seemingly, no critique of CRT would be complete without a 
discussion of Patricia Williams and her analysis of the Tawana Brawley 
controversy,136 Richard Delgado and his advocacy of narrative 
scholarship,137 Regina Austin and her analysis of black criminality,138 and 
                                                          
 131. The term appears in Farber and Sherry’s analysis of critical race theory.  See 
FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 127, at 5 (defining “radical multiculturalists” as those 
scholars who are politically progressive, adhere to various theories including CRT, 
feminism, and “legal writing about gays and lesbians,” and believe that reality is “subjective 
and socially constructed”). 
 132. Kozinski, supra note 130, at 46. 
 133. See Posner, supra note 125, at 40, 42 (explaining that the use of stories and 
narratives in CRT in effect removes any “rational inquiry” and allows Critical Race 
Theorists to exaggerate the problem of discussing race in America). 
 134. See generally Andrew Sullivan, Truth and Lies in the Language Class, SUNDAY 
TIMES (London), Jan. 12, 1997, at 1. 
 135. See generally FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 127 (critiquing flaws in the work of 
“radical multiculturalists” as serious). 
 136. See PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS:  DIARY OF A LAW 
PROFESSOR 169-78 (1991) (discussing the story of a fifteen-year-old black girl who was 
found after a four day disappearance with racial slurs written on her body).  The controversy 
concerned whether the girl was actually raped or whether she made up the story.  Id.  A 
grand jury investigation concluded that she fabricated the entire story, which called into 
question the credibility of black women alleging rape by white men.  Id. 
 137. See Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others:  A Plea for 
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Derrick Bell and his skeptical stance toward racial progress and his use of 
narrative.139 
The outsider critiques of CRT have generated a host of intellectual 
debates within and outside of CRT as scholars have countered many of the 
claims that conservatives have made concerning critical race analysis.  This 
Part considers the more prominent themes in anti-CRT scholarship and 
discusses how Critical Race Theorists and other progressive scholars have 
addressed these critiques. 
1. Critique of storytelling 
Several Critical Race Theorists have utilized narratives in their research, 
personal or otherwise, and have urged legal theorists to incorporate 
narrative as a legitimate methodological tool.140  Critical Race Theorists 
who advocate the employment of narratives argue that such stories can lead 
to greater understanding of the experiences of disadvantaged social groups, 
whose life experiences the law obfuscates.141 
The storytelling and narrative strand of critical race scholarship, though 
never the most ubiquitous methodology within CRT, has been the most 
provocative for conservative critics.  Daniel Farber and Suzanna Sherry, for 
example, have written extensive critiques of storytelling used by many 
legal theorists, including Critical Race Theorists and feminist theorists.142  
The critics of storytelling argue that personal stories do not advance 
analysis because other scholars cannot contest them; they are not grounded 
in empiricism; and they are inapplicable in a legal setting where analytical 
reasoning pervades.143 
Critical Race Theorists and other progressive scholars have responded by 
arguing that the focus on storytelling among CRT’s conservative critics 
distorts reality because CRT largely does not rely upon storytelling or 
                                                          
Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411, 2414 (1988) (arguing that through narrative and stories, 
people of color can gain the insight and strength needed to fight the stigma of racism). 
 138. See Regina Austin, “The Black Community,” Its Lawbreakers, and a Politics of 
Identification, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1769, 1774-75 (1989) (urging today’s black community to 
create a new identity that acknowledges notions of black lawbreaking and criminality). 
 139. See, e.g., Bell, supra note 52, at 373-74 (describing “racial realism” as the notion 
that for people of color, the status quo is not likely to improve, because forces will continue 
to maintain the white-over-black supremacy in society, and urging others to accept this 
reality and adopt new strategies accordingly). 
 140. See, e.g., Delgado, supra note 137, at 2411 (1988) (urging storytelling as a means to 
challenge the status quo and create a new reality where life is full of more possibility).  
Stories are effective because instead of being coercive, they enable the reader to judge the 
truth.  Id. at 2415. 
 141. See id. at 2439-40 (explaining that stories of minorities to help remove race and 
class based walls of isolation). 
 142. See generally FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 127, at 88-94 (arguing that because 
storytelling is personal, no real criticism of storytelling scholarship can be given without 
implicating, and ultimately insulting, the storyteller). 
 143. Id. at 89-90. 
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narrative.144  Instead, CRT engages almost exclusively in policy, doctrinal, 
or theoretical analysis.145  Furthermore, Critical Race Theorists have 
demonstrated that the use of narrative as a rhetorical tool in intellectual 
scholarship has existed for millennia; thus, focusing the anti-storytelling 
critique upon CRT and feminist theorists seems disingenuous and 
ideological.146  Also, Critical Race Theorists have argued that law, in many 
respects, depends upon narrative in practice.  A criminal trial, for example, 
advances competing narratives through the usage of physical evidence, 
testimony, and framing of the “facts” in opening and closing statements.147 
2. Critique of nihilism 
The conservative assertion that CRT is nihilistic seems immediately 
problematic.  The emergence of CRT as a coherent body of legal theory 
resulted because Critical Race Theorists who worked in the CLS movement 
did not accept the “rights-trashing” approach of some CLS scholars.148  
While CLS wanted to abandon the rights approach, Critical Race Theorists 
recognized and wrote passionately about the value of rights in the history 
of persons of color and their struggles against racist deprivation.149 
Nevertheless, many conservative critiques of CRT argue that CRT does 
not embrace the “rule of law” and that it portrays the law as unable to bring 
about positive social change.150  The responses to the nihilism critique 
                                                          
 144. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, On Telling Stories in School:  A Reply To Farber and 
Sherry, 46 VAND. L. REV. 665, 668-69 (1993) (noting that only one-quarter of CRT 
scholarship is written in narrative form, thereby dispelling Farber and Sherry’s harsh 
criticism of CRT’s emphasis on storytelling).  Delgado also attacks Farber and Sherry’s 
notion that storytelling does not provide any analysis or reasoning, noting that most stories 
include “statistics, case authority, and doctrinal analysis.”  Id. at 669-70.  See also Alex M. 
Johnson, Jr., Defending the Use of Narrative and Giving Content to the Voice of Color:  
Rejecting the Imposition of Process Theory in Legal Scholarship, 79 IOWA L. REV. 803, 845 
(1994) (supporting the use of storytelling in CRT because it provides a “Voice of Color” 
which is necessary to articulate “the unique insights that come from the duality inherent in 
the existence of any person of color”). 
 145. Delgado, supra note 144, at 668-69. 
 146. See id. at 666 (“Empowered groups long ago established a host of stories, 
narratives, conventions, and understandings that today, through repetition, seem natural and 
true.”). 
 147. See, e.g., Michael A. Coffino, Genre, Narrative and Judgment:  Legal and Protest 
Song Stories in Two Criminal Cases, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 679, 686-89 (noting that both 
judges and lawyers use stories to explain legal facts and effectively respond to existing legal 
perceptions); Richard K. Sherwin, Law Frames:  Historical Truth and Narrative Necessity 
in a Criminal Case, 47 STAN. L. REV. 39 (1994) (urging lawyers and legal scholars to 
engage in storytelling as a way to provide clarity, given the large amount of information that 
they must present). 
 148. See Hutchinson, supra note 112, at 1476-77 (explaining that Critical Race Theorists 
believe that increasing rights for minorities is vital to achieve racial justice). 
 149. See supra text accompanying notes 43-47. 
 150. See FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 127, at 35, 38 (criticizing multiculturalist legal 
thinkers for abandoning legal reasoning as a mechanism to bring change and instead turning 
to storytelling as their method of persuasion); Rosen, supra note 19, at 27 (criticizing 
Critical Race Theorists’ belief that the legal process is ineffective in bringing about change 
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uncover the fallacies of these claims by pointing to the divergence of 
Critical Race Theorists from more radical forms of poststructuralism 
practiced by CLS scholars who engage in rights trashing.151 
3. Critique of nonneutrality 
Critical Race Theorists have utilized postmodern analysis to contest the 
law’s claim to objectivity and neutrality—a hallmark of CLS thought.152  
Because analytical reasoning occurs in a social, historical, and political 
context, the “truth” is a contingent and elusive concept.153 
Conservative critics have capitalized on CRT’s critique of objectivity, 
arguing that CRT does not believe in the “truth” or in reasoning.154  Yet, an 
argument that the “truth” is socially constructed or contingent does not 
necessitate the abolition of reasoning.155  Instead, as Critical Race Theorists 
have asserted, skepticism toward reasoning means that we should make 
tentative and more contextualized our accounts of law and racism, rather 
than accepting grand or totalizing theories that purport to apply to all 
situations, irrespective of historical, social, political, and economic 
context.156  Intersectionality and multidimensionality, for example, criticize 
the sweeping reform agendas of CRT, feminist theory, and queer theory 
that overlook the relationships among race, gender, class, and sexuality.  
Yet, these scholars remain committed to engaging legal institutions as 
potential sites for progressive social change.157 
                                                          
because society’s perception of facts is contingent on race and their belief that neutral laws 
only advance white domination). 
 151. See Robert L. Hayman, The Color of Tradition:  Critical Race Theory and 
Postmodern Constitutional Traditionalism, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 57, 68 (1995) 
(explaining that although Critical Race Theorists are divided over whether racial justice is a 
feasible goal, they are “united by some form of antisubordination theory, and all insist upon 
the necessity of struggle”) (internal citation omitted). 
 152. See supra text accompanying note 42. 
 153. See Hayman, supra note 151, at 60-62 (discussing postmodern and CRT skepticism 
of “truth” and objectivity). 
 154. See FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 127, at 35, 95-96 (criticizing Patricia William’s 
interpretation of the Tawana Brawley controversy). 
 155. See Harris, supra note 42, at 765 (noting the blending of postmodern skepticism and 
modern reasoning in CRT). 
 156. See Hayman, supra note 151, at 63-64 (stating that Critical Race Theorists are 
attempting to include discussions about “new histories, narratives, and counter-myths” in 
the majoritarian jurisprudence dialogue) (internal citation omitted). 
 157. See Crenshaw, supra note 53, at 1331 (supporting the civil rights movement’s 
strategy of urging legal reform as a means to achieve greater racial equality); Roberts, supra 
note 50, at 1480 (noting feminist legal theory’s position that privacy laws that punish 
women for their reproductive choices should be struck down); Hutchinson, Identity Crisis, 
supra note at 89, at 309 (discussing legal arguments made in intersectionality literature). 
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C. Critical Engagement:  Dealing With Unfinished Business 
Despite efforts to rebut many of the conservative critiques of CRT, the 
project of considering conservative and internal critiques remains 
unfinished.  Internal critics, as the progressive race blindness movement 
demonstrates, continue to challenge the assumptions of CRT from a 
progressive perspective.  One recent strand of internal criticism argues that 
multiplicity theories marginalize a desperately needed analysis of class 
within CRT.  This critique remains largely unexplored.  Furthermore, more 
established conservative critiques, such as the critique of nihilism, could 
receive a fresh examination.  The remainder of this Part addresses these 
two criticisms. 
1. The dichotomy of multiplicity theories and class analysis 
Internal critics continue to contribute to the evolution of CRT.  Recent 
internal critiques have argued that CRT has abandoned class or materialist 
analysis.  Richard Delgado—whose work is among the most influential in 
CRT—has urged Critical Race Theorists to engage in class analysis by 
directing their attention to the material consequences of racial 
subordination.158  In two recent articles, Delgado argues that class theory is 
marginalized by discussions of “unconscious racism”159 and from 
multiplicity identity theories.160  Furthermore, at the CRT Workshop held at 
the Washington College of Law in 2003, Daria Roithmayer presented a 
paper that similarly criticized CRT for failing to undertake class analysis.161  
Roithmayer, like Delgado, argued that multiplicity theories have 
supplanted materiality concerns. 
Delgado and Roithmayer make powerful observations regarding the need 
for class analysis within CRT.  Race and class relate to each other in three 
important ways.  First, racism causes economic deprivation.  Virtually 
every statistical measure of economic well-being shows that persons of 
color are worse off than whites.162  An abundance of social science research 
                                                          
 158. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Crossroads and Blind Alleys:  A Critical Examination 
of Recent Writing About Race, 82 TEX. L. REV. 121, 151 (2003). 
 159. See generally Richard Delgado, Two Ways to Think about Race:  Reflections on the 
Id, the Ego, and Other Reformist Theories of Equal Protection, 89 GEO. L.J. 2279, 2289, 
2291 (2001). 
 160. See Delgado, supra note 158, at 122, 124, 127-28 (arguing that the attention of 
theorists on intersectionality and essentialism issues, along with race and sexual orientation 
studies, impedes class analysis). 
 161. At the time of publication, a formal draft was not available for citation. 
 162. See, e.g., ANDREW HACKER, TWO NATIONS:  BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE, 
HOSTILE, UNEQUAL (1992) (citing statistics that show that earnings in white households are 
higher than earnings in black households and that even among similarly educated whites and 
blacks, the income of whites is much higher); ORLANDO PATTERSON, THE ORDEAL OF 
INTEGRATION:  PROGRESS AND RESENTMENT IN AMERICA’S “RACIAL” CRISIS 25 (1997) 
(discussing income statistics based on race, including that in 1995, the median income of all 
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links these disparities to racial injustice.163  Second, the combination of race 
and poverty exacerbates the inequality of poor people of color.164  
Sociological research reveals that poor persons of color, unlike poor 
whites, tend to live in areas of concentrated poverty, where they lack access 
to important social resources, such as adequate education, housing, and 
employment opportunities.165  The lack of stabilizing social resources in 
these communities, as well as the inattention of U.S. power structures, 
leads to ongoing generational poverty.166  Finally, imperial capitalism has 
figured prominently in the subordination of persons of color.  The 
decimation of Native Americans, the enslavement of Africans, the 
exploitation of Asian “immigrant” labor, and the conquest of Latinos 
through westward expansion all demonstrate the linkage of race and class 
domination.167 
Due to this relationship between class and race, Critical Race Theorists 
should heed the advice of Delgado, Roithmayer, and other scholars whose 
work engages race and class.  Critical Race Theorists should undertake the 
task of engaging class inequality and advocate for legal doctrines and 
policies that promote substantive, rather than formal equality.  While many 
Critical Race Theorists have engaged in class research,168 Delgado and 
Roithmayer correctly note the deficiency of sustained inquiry in this area 
within CRT. 
                                                          
African American families was 60.8%of the median income of European American 
families—only a 1.6% improvement from the 1967 ratio). 
 163. See generally WILLIAM J. WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS:  THE WORLD OF THE 
NEW URBAN POOR 111-12 (linking class and racial inequality). 
 164. See, e.g., WILLIAM J. WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED:  THE INNER CITY, THE 
UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 136-37 (1987) (explaining that a person’s race and class 
group determines whether the person will have access to “organizational channels of 
privilege and influence”); WILSON, supra note 163, at 196 (claiming that minorities do not 
have the resources to compete in the open job market because of the crushing effects of the 
challenges that they face due to their race and poverty). 
 165. DOUGLASS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID:  SEGREGATION 
AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993). 
 166. See WILSON, supra note 163, at 49 (explaining that the Reagan and Bush 
administrations decreased spending on direct aid to cities, including programs such as 
“general revenue sharing, urban mass-transit, public service jobs and job training, 
compensatory education, social service, block grants, local public works, economic 
development assistance, and urban development action grants”). 
 167. See Tayyab Mahmud, Colonialism and Modern Constructions of Race:  A 
Preliminary Inquiry, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1219 (1999) (linking racial construction to 
colonial exploitation). 
 168. See, e.g., Regina Austin, “Step on a Crack, Break Your Mother’s Back”:  Poor 
Moms, Myths of Authority, and Drug-Related Evictions from Public Housing, 14 YALE J.L. 
& FEMINISM 273 (2002) (discussing how poor minority women living in public housing are 
disadvantaged by the government’s no-fault eviction policy); Jerome Culp, Colorblind 
Remedies and the Intersectionality of Oppression:  Policy Arguments Masquerading as 
Moral Claims, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 162, 177-82 (1994) (explaining that the policy of 
colorblindness is ineffective in changing the racial status quo that exists); Dorothy Roberts, 
Irrationality and Sacrifice in Welfare Reform Consensus, 81 VA. L. REV. 2607 (1995) 
(showing how conservative “welfare reform policies” hurt black children). 
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While this Article generally agrees with Delgado and Roithmayer’s plea 
for class analysis, it takes a different approach to the role of multiplicity 
theories in marginalizing class analysis.  This divergence may seem minor, 
but it is ultimately vital for theorizing on the relationship between race and 
class.  In Delgado and Roithmayer’s critique of multiplicity theories, both 
theorists conflate multiplicity with a focus on identity—rather than a focus 
on structures of subordination.169  Although Delgado and Roithmayer 
correctly note that many multiplicity theorists focus attention on “identity 
construction,” writings in multidimensionality and intersectionality have 
not exclusively focused on questions of status.  Instead, these bodies of 
literature have sought not only to complicate questions of identity but also 
to demonstrate that structures of subordination themselves are 
multidimensional.  The multidimensionality literature also asserts that 
Critical Race Theorists cannot fully understand racism and all of its 
material harms without engaging structures of patriarchy, heterosexism, 
and economic domination.170  Furthermore, class, along with race, seems 
like a probable place for identity construction as well.171  In addition, 
multiplicity theories can explain why poor persons of color tend to remain 
poor, while poor whites have greater opportunities for economic 
advancement,172 or why women of color are the poorest segment of United 
States society.173  The explanation for these social realities rests on an 
appreciation of the multidimensionality of race and class.  So, identity 
theorists can, and should, take class into account when describing the 
processes of social construction that create racial identities.  Furthermore, 
Critical Race Theorists need not engage in an either/or proposition of 
forsaking identity or multiplicity for class analysis.  It is possible to engage 
in both types of analyses.174  Accordingly, multiplicity theories can serve 
an important role in a critical race analysis that emphasizes class. 
                                                          
 169. Delgado, supra note 158, at 122, 124, 127. 
 170. See Hutchinson, supra note 75, at 10 (arguing that multidimensionality treats 
oppression as “complex and multilayered”). 
 171. See, e.g., Martha Mahoney, Class and Status in American Law:  Race, Interest, and 
the Anti-Transformation Cases, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 799, 803-04 (2003) (explaining that 
classes obtain their identity from their economic position, their shared understanding and 
their shared action); DAVID R. ROEDIGER, THE WAGES OF WHITENESS:  RACE AND THE 
MAKING OF THE AMERICAN WORKING CLASS 8, 19 (1991) (arguing that because the identities 
of whiteness and the working class arose simultaneously, there is a presumption of 
whiteness with the term worker). 
 172. See supra notes 162-65 and accompanying text. 
 173. See Laura M. Padilla, Intersectionality and Positionality:  Situating Women of 
Color in the Affirmative Action Dialogue, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 843, 886 (1997) (explaining 
that women of color earn less than white women, and that only lower paid work is generally 
available for women of color). 
 174. Even Delgado has written on the problem of essentialism and the black/white 
paradigm.  See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Rodrigo’s Fifteenth Chronicle:  Racial Mixture, 
Latino-Critical Scholarship, and the Black-White Binary, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1181 (1997) 
(arguing that binary racial discourse perpetuates racial subordination); Richard Delgado, 
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2. Critique of nihilism revisited 
While many Critical Race Theorists have responded to the conservative 
characterization of CRT as being nihilistic, this Article supplements these 
responses with empirical research that justifies CRT’s suspicion of law as a 
site of social change.  Although CRT criticizes legal structures, Critical 
Race Theorists rely on law and legal reasoning as instruments for antiracist 
agendas.175  Rebuttals to the antinihilism argument have centered on this 
dual consciousness of CRT.176 
While these responses to conservative critiques of CRT’s cynicism are 
effective, Critical Race Theorists could bolster their arguments by pointing 
to political science data that demonstrate the majoritarian nature of the 
Court’s decision making.  Rather than protecting disadvantaged classes 
through the judicial review process, the Court responds primarily to 
majoritarian concerns,177 thus hindering the attainment of social justice.178  
Although some Critical Race Theorists have demonstrated the majoritarian 
nature of the Court through doctrinal analysis,179 several political scientists 
have conducted substantial empirical research, which fortifies the doctrinal 
                                                          
Rodrigo’s Sixth Chronicle:  Intersections, Essences, and the Dilemma of Social Reform, 68 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 639 (1993) (discussing the complexity of identity politics). 
 175. See supra text accompanying notes 43-45. 
 176. See supra text accompanying notes 46-49. 
 177. See, e.g., THOMAS R. MARSHALL, PUBLIC OPINION AND THE SUPREME COURT 192-93 
(1989) (“Overall, the evidence suggests that the modern Court has been an essentially 
majoritarian institution.  Where clear poll margins exist, three-fifths to two-thirds of Court 
rulings reflect the polls.”); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT 
AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 239 (2002) (explaining that the Supreme Court’s 
rulings represent public opinion because the justices are chosen by the President, who is 
elected by the people); David G. Barnum, The Supreme Court and Public Opinion:  Judicial 
Decision Making in the Post-New Deal Period, 47 J. POL. 652, 662 (1985) (arguing that 
despite its reputation as a countermajoritarian institution, the post-New Deal Court has been 
largely majoritarian or, if not, has rendered decisions consistent with emerging trends in 
public opinion); William Mishler & Reginald S. Sheehan, The Supreme Court as a 
Countermajoritarian Institution?  The Impact of Public Opinion on Supreme Court 
Decisions, 87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 87, 97 (1993) (explaining that by ruling according to the 
policy opinions of the majority, the Supreme Court reinforces and legitimizes majoritarian 
opinions and concerns); Helmut Norpoth & Jeffrey A. Segal, Popular Influence on Supreme 
Court Decisions, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 711 (1994) (noting that out of 130 Supreme Court 
decisions for which public opinion of the issue was known, 63% of the Court’s decisions 
correlated to the majoritarian opinion). 
 178. See GIRARDEAU A. SPANN, RACE AGAINST THE COURT:  THE SUPREME COURT AND 
MINORITIES IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 27, 31 (1993) (arguing that because many 
challenges to majoritarian laws and policies are equal protection claims that receive the 
deferential rational basis scrutiny, the Supreme Court can easily abide by majoritarian 
preferences in its legal reasoning, to the detriment of minorities); Hutchinson, supra note 75, 
at 618 (critiquing equal protection doctrine as protecting dominant, rather than minority, 
interests); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, The Majoritarian Difficulty, Affirmative Action, 
Sodomy, and Supreme Court Politics, 23 LAW & INEQ. 1 (forthcoming 2004) (demonstrating 
how equal protection doctrine harms social justice efforts and sides with dominant 
interests). 
 179. See, e.g., Spann, supra note 36, at 1426-36 (discussing the Supreme Court’s 
standing decisions to illustrate that the Court rules in favor of majority interests). 
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research of Critical Race Theorists.180  For example, when public opinion 
polls are available, they show that the Court makes decisions that largely 
reflect majoritarian public viewpoints.181  This relationship between the 
Court and public opinion exists even in the civil rights context, where 
minority interests should matter more under traditional conceptions of 
judicial review.182  Thus, as several Critical Race Theorists have 
demonstrated through extensive doctrinal analysis, the Court does not 
exercise judicial review to protect politically vulnerable classes from 
majoritarian abuse.  Instead, the Court’s doctrine facilitates majoritarian 
interests.  This aspect of judicial review lends support to critical race 
skepticism of law as a viable instrument of progressive social change. 
IV.  CONTINUING THE EVOLUTIONARY PROJECT:  AN INTRODUCTION TO 
THE ESSAYS IN THIS SYMPOSIUM 
The works in this Symposium advance the evolutionary project of CRT.  
Regina Austin makes an extremely timely and compelling contribution to 
this Symposium, given ongoing debates within CRT concerning the need 
for class analysis.  Austin’s work on the exploitation of poor persons of 
color in capital markets demonstrates the ongoing commitment of critical 
race scholars to class analysis. 
Brant Lee’s “network economic analysis” unveils the structural 
dimensions of whiteness, thus furthering CRT’s understanding of racism as 
a product of institutional, ideological, and cultural sources, rather than 
atomistic acts by “bad” individuals.  Lee’s article demonstrates the 
pervasiveness, fluidity, and subtlety of whiteness as a societal norm and the 
need for concerted efforts to dismantle racial inequality that transcends the 
enactment of mere formal equality regimes. 
Reginald Oh’s deconstructionist reading of the Court’s affirmative action 
jurisprudence unveils how equal protection doctrine obscures the 
geographic spheres of white racial domination.  Oh’s rich analysis unveils 
how the Court’s myopic equal protection doctrine falsely portrays blacks, 
concentrated in urban areas, as “politically powerful” for purposes of a 
process theory/heightened scrutiny analysis. 
                                                          
 180. See Barnum, supra note 177, at 656-61 (tracking public opinion over time and its 
correlation to Supreme Court decisions); Mishler & Sheehan, supra note 177, at 90 
(discussing the statistical methodology of examining the relationship between public 
opinion and Supreme Court rulings). 
 181. MARSHALL, supra note 177, at 192-93; SEGAL, supra note 177, at 239; Barnum, 
supra note 177, at 662. 
 182. See, e.g., Thomas R. Marshall & Joseph Ignagni, Supreme Court and Public 
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Reginald Leamon Robinson’s contribution renews the author’s status as 
an unrepentant, internal critic of the deployment of race consciousness 
among Critical Race Theorists.  Robinson’s provocative work urges 
Critical Race Theorists to abandon race consciousness, and it advances the 
belief that race-talk will inevitably fail to eradicate the inequality among 
whites and persons of color. 
The organizers of the Washington College of Law CRT Workshop 
wanted to invigorate CRT and to create a forum for discussing race in a 
creative fashion.  Collectively, these texts advance these goals.  The articles 
push critical race analysis into new directions, while adhering to the 
foundational themes that have defined CRT.  The articles focus outwardly 
by challenging white-supremacist domination, but they also focus inwardly 
by questioning cherished tenets of CRT.  Recently, other law reviews have 
dedicated issues to CRT.183  Hopefully, these publications will spark new 
theories and innovations among Critical Race Theorists and assist in the 
development of strategies to combat the intractable problem of racial 
injustice and inequality. 
 
                                                          
 183. E.g., Symposium, Theorizing the Connections Among Systems of Subordination 
Responses & Commentary, 71 UMKC L. REV. 227 (2002). 
